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Insurance
by Stephen L. Cotter*
and
Charles M. McDaniel, Jr.**

I.

INTRODUCTION

During this survey period, Georgia appellate courts reviewed the usual
number of insurance cases, fine-tuned policy terms and refined the
insured/insurer relationship. One area of intense interest concerned
limiting subrogation. Another area of interest involved the "limited
release" used in uninsured motorist litigation. The Georgia General
Assembly primarily focused on managed care, with litigation sure to
follow as courts apply the remedial tools. Overall, insurers managed to
enforce most adequately articulated policy terms and successfully
avoided embarrassing and costly "bad faith" decisions through the timely
use of declaratory judgment proceedings.
II.

HEALTH & DISABILITY INSURANCE

Intense and varied activity in the courts and General Assembly reflect
the crushing cost of health care and the economic interests of those
involved. While national legislation remains stymied, Georgia lawmakers have been busy. The following discussion relates to matters not
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American Bar Association, Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, Defense Research
Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., 1982); University of South Carolina School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member,
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preempted by the controlling provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.'
The Georgia Supreme Court's "complete compensation" decision in
Duncan v. Integon General Insurance Corp.2 set off a series of actions
in the area of subrogation. The supreme court declared, as a matter of
public policy, that the complete compensation rule limits the applicability of a reimbursement provision, at least where the insurance contract
does not contain an express provision to the contrary.3 The court's
decision followed the weight of national authority.4 In Jefferson-Pilot
Insurance Co. v. Fraker, the court of appeals interpreted the supreme
court's instruction in Duncan requiring "an express provision to the
contrary" to mean that the contract must expressly articulate less than
complete compensation, rather than merely referring to some formula by
which less than complete compensation would be received.'
However, in Davis v. KaiserFoundationHealth Plan of Georgia,Inc.,7
in which there was a sufficiently clear provision, the court held that
Georgia's public policy does not prohibit the enforcement of a policy
provision modifying the complete compensation rule.8 Of course,
effective July 1, 1997, the General Assembly began to regulate this
subject matter through Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 33-24-56.1 vis-a-vis certain types of medical expense.9 The
statute does bring some standardization to the treatment of claims
falling under its terms.
In Homebuilders Ass'n of Georgia v. Morris,'" the court of appeals
considered subrogation for worker's compensation benefits regulated by
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b), which requires an injured employee "to be
'fully and completely compensated' for all his economic and non-economic
losses before an employer/insurer is entitled" to subrogate." "Fully and
completely" compensated, at least for worker's compensation subrogation
purposes, means without any deduction for comparative/contributory

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999 & Supp. 1999).
2. 267 Ga. 646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997).
3. Id. at 647, 482 S.E.2d at 326.
4. Id. (citing 8A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE § 4903.65, at 25 (Supp. 19961997)).
5. 234 Ga. App. 430, 507 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
6. Id. at 431, 507 S.E.2d at 189-90.
7. 235 Ga. App. 13, 508 S.E.2d 431 (1998).
8. Id. at 15, 508 S.E.2d at 432. "Even if the total amount you collect is less than your
actual losses from the accident, you must pay us." Id. at 14, 508 S.E.2d at 432.
9. See O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (Supp. 1999).
10. 238 Ga. App. 194, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999).
11. Id. at 195, 518 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(B)).
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negligence or assumption of the risk. 12 This implementation should
significantly diminish employer/insurer subrogation claims in other than
clear tort liability situations. In the upcoming year, we should learn
whether the "all" in O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 means "fully and
completely" under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1.
Uninsured motorist subrogation may not be brought in the name of
the carrier. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cox,13
the supreme court reasoned that the insured must participate in its own
name to resolve questions of liability. 4
The cumbersome nature of
such apparently required actions should discourage uninsured motorist
subrogation claims. Indeed, this survey period was a difficult year for
subrogors.
The General Assembly was proactive in the area of managed care by
trying to level the playing field. One Y2K event should be the implementation of Governor Barnes' substantive amendments to the Patient
Protection Act of 1996.15 The amendments mandate multiple disclosures of information to potential enrollees, access "with reasonable
promptness and in a manner which promotes continuity," "medically
necessary" services "24 hours a day [and] seven days a week," and
reimbursement for emergency and out-of-area services.' 6 A "consumer
choice option" is also required, with the incremental cost thereof limited
by regulated deductibles, copayments, and co-insurance and overall
premium differentials, under a varying formula based upon actual cost
and various percentage limitations. 7
To help implement these and other rights, the General Assembly
established a Consumer's Insurance Advocate within the Governor's
Office of Consumer Affairs." The Advocate is authorized to appear in
proceedings before the Commissioner and Insurance Department, to
appear in administrative proceedings conducted by similar federal
regulatory bodies, and to initiate and intervene in related judicial
proceedings. 9
The Advocate is privy to and authorized to take
information and discovery relating to proposed rate increases and is

12.
13.
14.
15.
ments,
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
271 Ga. 77, 515 S.E.2d 832 (1999).
Id. at 77, 515 S.E.2d at 832.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1999). For the text of the 1999 amendsee 1999 Ga. Laws 350-61.
O.C.G.A. § 33-20A-5 (Supp. 1999).
Id. § 33-20A-9.1.
See id. §§ 33-57-1 to -8.
Id. § 33-57-4.
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authorized to involve those experts necessary for the implementation of
this office, subject to regulation by the General Assembly.2"
Also, the General Assembly enacted a managed care diligence statute
to address the failure of a managed care plan to exercise ordinary
diligence. 21 As with products liability, this provision may not be waived
or modified by contract. 22 This new civil remedy is only available
against the managed care entity, not the employer, and punitive
damages are prohibited.23 Prerequisites to maintaining a cause of
action under this statute include exhaustion of grievance procedures
offered by the managed *care entity under O.C.G.A. section 33-20A-5,
thirty days written notice of intent to file suit, and agreement to submit
to an independent review, if the managed care
entity agrees within ten
24
days of receipt of notice of intent to file suit.
The related Patient's Right to Independent Review Act 25 established
an independent review process to be administered by the Health
Planning Agency.26 Independent review organizations, which must
meet alternative definitions and may not be affiliated with managed care
entities, 27 may register and be assigned to consider particular unresolved conflicts. 2s Timely receipt, acknowledgment, processing, replies,
and decisions are required.2 9 The expert reviewer's determination is
due within fifteen business days after expiration of all other time
limits.3" If favorable to the enrollee, the decision is final and binding
on the managed care entity.3 ' Compliance with that decision shields
the managed care entity from liability under O.C.G.A. section 51-1-48 for
abiding by the decision, but not from liability for acts that occurred prior
to the decision.32 If the decision is in favor of the managed care entity,
it "shall create a rebuttable presumption ...

that the managed care

entity's prior determination was appropriate."33 The role of the Health

20.

Id. §§ 33-57-5 to -7.

21.

See id. § 51-1-48.

22.

Id. § 51-1-48(b).

23. Id. § 51-1-48(a), (c).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 51-1-49.
§ 33-20A-30.
§§ 33-20A-30 to -41.
§ 33-20A-39.
§§ 33-20A-32, -35.

29. Id. § 33-20A-36.
30.

Id. § 33-20A-36(d).

31. Id. § 33-20A-37(a).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 33-20A-37(b).
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Planning Agency is administrative, and it must provide necessary rules
and regulations to implement the Act. 4
Two other acts modified various aspects of health care. The first act
prescribes confidentiality of pharmacy records, absent a patient's written
release or consent. 5 It also requires the insurer to pay the undisputed
portion of any claim within fifteen working days of receiving written
claim for payment of proof of loss. 6 It further assesses interest at
eighteen percent per annum on wrongful withholdings.37
Similar
interest charges are imposed for loss of time benefits with respect to
each thirty day period of lost time. 8 The second act mandates the
insurance reimbursement for prescription contraceptives3 9 because of
a legislative finding that the absence thereof "is largely responsible for
the fact that women spend sixty-eight percent more in out-of-pocket
expenses for health care than men."4 °
Judicially speaking, the court of appeals in Lancaster v. USAA
Casualty Insurance Co.,4 directly addressed the burden of proof placed
on the insured for demonstrating a bad faith denial under O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6 in a medical context. 42 The court analyzed the various
burdens of proof imposed on a plaintiff claiming bad faith in this
context. 43 Under Hutcheson v. Daniels," expert testimony is no longer
necessary to prove causation if the accident and the treatment are
temporally close. 45 However, as in Lancaster, absent this type of
common sense deduction, Eberhart v. Morris Brown College46 requires
that a fact finder must be presented with medical testimony regarding
causation.47 Lancaster fell into the latter category and lost. In an
interesting concurring opinion, Judge Blackburn discussed the systemic
problem in the general use of persons who are not "independent
experts."48
He encouraged trial courts to exercise their inherent

34. Id. § 33-20A-41.
35.

Id. § 33-24-59.4(b).

36. Id. § 33-24-59.5(b)(1).
37.

Id. § 33-24-59.5(c).

38. Id. §§ 33-29-3(b)(8), 33-30-6(b)(5).
39. Id. § 33-24-59.6(c).
40.
41.
42.

Id. § 33-24-59.6(a)(3).
232 Ga. App. 805, 502 S.E.2d 752 (1998).
Id. at 807, 502 S.E.2d at 753.

43. Id.
44. 224 Ga. App. 560, 481 S.E.2d 567 (1997).
45. Id. at 561, 481 S.E.2d at 569.
46. 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E.2d 832 (1987).
47. Id. at 518-19, 352 S.E.2d at 834.
48. 232 Ga. App. at 809, 502 S.E.2d at 755 (Blackburn, J., concurring and concurring
specially).
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authority to select truly independent experts.49 However, the court of
appeals, in American Ass'n of Cab Cos. v. Olukoya,50 found that
attacking an opposing expert with a bulk tender of hearsay and
irrelevant information sprinkled with admissible evidence was an
inappropriate tender.5 1 In comparison, the court of appeals in Canada
52
v. Shropshire
admitted evidence of a "personal relationship" between
plaintiff's attorney and a witness who was plaintiff's treating chiropractor.5" Both were involved in cases brought by plaintiff for claims
arising from two previous car accidents. 4 Under Shropshire such
selective evidence can be admitted, even though it is somewhat
irrelevant, to illustrate favor or bias of a witness.5 In fact, O.C.G.A.
section 24-9-68 permits evidence of a witness' feelings towards a party
so a jury can consider and infer the possibility
that a witness' objectivity
6
may be clouded by a close relationship.
III.

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE

Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals
attempted to clarify particular policy terms and refine the relationship
between insurer and insured in the last year.
In Anderson v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co.,57 the court of
appeals succinctly stated Georgia's modern rule regarding the duty to
defend under a liability insurance policy. 8 The complaint in Anderson,
taken as true, clearly alleged acts which were "expected or intended"
and, hence, were barred by the "intentional act exclusion."5 9 However,
the insured asserted that the facts set forth in the complaint were not
true and suggested facts which would place the claim within policy
coverage if proven. 0 Citing Colonial Oil Industries v. Underwriters
Subscribing to Policy Numbers,6 the court held the insurer had a duty
to conduct an initial reasonable investigation into the insured's

49. Id. at 809-10, 502 S.E.2d at 755-56.
50. 233 Ga. App. 731, 505 S.E.2d 761 (1998).
51. Id. at 735, 505 S.E.2d at 765-66.
52. 232 Ga. App. 341, 501 S.E.2d 860 (1998).
53. Id. at 342, 501 S.E.2d at 861.
54. Id. at 341, 501 S.E.2d at 861.
55. Id., 501 S.E.2d at 862.
56. Id. at 343, 501 S.E.2d at 862.
57. 235 Ga. App. 306, 508 S.E.2d 726 (1998).
58. Id. at 306, 508 S.E.2d at 726.
59. Id. at 308, 508 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Penn-American Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am.
Veterans, 268 Ga. 564, 565, 490 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1997)).
60. Id.
61. 268 Ga. 561, 562, 491 S.E.2d 337, 338-39 (1997).
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contentions." If the investigation revealed facts that the claim fell
within the policy coverage, then a duty to defend would exist." This
declaratory judgment action was in compliance with the rule in Colonial
Oil. Therefore, in Georgia, the insurer can no longer rely on the "four
corners" test for ascertaining coverage; instead, the insurer must
shoulder the duty of reasonable investigation when faced with the
contentions of an insured that, if believed, might warrant coverage. If
that investigation reveals facts supporting coverage, the insurer has a
duty to defend the claim as well.
The court in Anderson also analyzed the interplay between the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the obligation of the
insured to cooperate fully in an insurer's investigation and defense of a
claim brought against the insurer." The insured, Anderson, was sued
for various torts that arguably fell within the coverage of the homeowner's policy. While criminal charges were pending, Anderson refused
to answer questions, asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. She did generally indicate that the injuries were
accidental and that she did not expect or intend bodily injury.6 5 The
court reviewed Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,"6 in which an
insured was not required to choose between forfeiting the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or losing the civil case
because of an inability to resist an automatic summary judgment. 7
The court noted that Anderson could not "wield her Fifth Amendment
privilege as a shield and a sword by demanding coverage" and then
refusing to answer questions material to the insurance contract.6 The
court compared her situation to that of "a plaintiff who creates her own
dilemma by bringing the civil action to enforce a contract, and who then
refuses to provide information material to the defendant's defense by
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege." 9 The court specifically held
that Anderson's failure to cooperate was a material breach of the
contract sufficient to void coverage. 70 However, given the peculiar facts
of the case, the court found no reason to penalize the insured.7 The
insured specifically offered to answer questions fully after the pending

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Anderson, 235 Ga. App. at 309, 508 S.E.2d at 730.
Id.
Id. at 310-12, 508 S.E.2d at 730-31.
Id.
901 F.2d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 1990).
235 Ga. App. at 311, 508 S.E.2d at 731.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 731-32.
Id.
Id. at 312, 508 S.E.2d at 731-32.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 732.
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criminal proceedings terminated.72 Inasmuch as "'[wlillfulness and
fraud are essential ingredients to substantiate the defense of failure to
cooperate,'" there had been no showing by the insurer that the time73
delay involved in waiting for cooperation would impact its rights.
Furthermore, a breach of the duty to cooperate could not be determined
as a matter of law.74 Anderson reveals the relative rights and obliga-

tions of an insured and insurer in the context of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. In the context of a third-party
liability claim, as long as the insured claims an unintentional or
justifiable act, offers to cooperate fully, and has an opportunity to
cooperate without prejudicing the insurer, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination seems to trump the liability
insurance policy's duty of cooperation.
The court of appeals revisited the innocent co-insured doctrine in
Brown v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. 75

Conamed insured, Louise

Brown, sought to recover for her estranged husband's vandalism to the
residence where they once both lived. Both were named insureds on the
homeowner's policy. The policy excluded intentional loss "by or at the
direction of an 'insured.' 7 Had the policy excluded intentional loss
only at the direction of the insured, under Sales v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 7 7 the innocent co-insured, Louise Brown, would have been
protected. However, the court followed Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.
v. Dean7" and held that the phrase "'an insured' creates a joint obligation between co-insureds," and hence, the innocent co-insured suffers the
consequences of the intentionally inflicted vandalism. 79 Brown and its
progeny illustrate the importance of seemingly minor policy terms.
In the area of business exclusions, it appears that insurers have
finally begun to use enforceable policy terms to avoid consistently
incurring business-related losses under homeowner's liability insurance
policies. In Furgerson v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,80 the
court of appeals enforced a business exclusion for home day care services
in favor of the insurer."1 The insured homeowner was paid $65 per

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted by court).
Id.
239 Ga. App. 251, 519 S.E.2d 726 (1999).

76. Id. at 251, 519 S.E.2d at 727.
77. 849 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1988).
78. 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
79. 239 Ga. App. at 254, 519 S.E.2d at 729 (quoting Fireman'sFund, 212 Ga. App. at
264, 441 S.E.2d at 438).
80.

237 Ga. App. 637, 516 S.E.2d 350 (1999).

81. Id. at 639, 516 S.E.2d at 352.
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week to provide regular in-home babysitting services for one child.82
The insurer had the "burden of showing both the existence of the
exclusion and its applicability."83 Furthermore, the court observed that
"exclusions to coverage must be construed strictly in favor of the insured
and against the insurer" unless the policy is clear, explicit, and
unambiguous.84 The court specifically rejected the proposition that
babysitting for one child did not constitute a business as defined in the
policy.85 The court noted that when an insurance policy is sufficiently
clear, courts have no right to strain the construction.88 Because
Cambridge Mutual's policy language met that standard, the court
enforced the business exclusion against the insured.8 7
88
Similarly, in Larson v. GeorgiaFarm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,
another panel of the court of appeals affirmed a trial court's enforcement
of a business exclusion via summary judgment even though "business
pursuits" were not defined by the particular policy.89 A much earlier
case, Brown v. PeninsularFire Insurance Co.,9 ° seemed to preclude the
use of summary judgment in the area of business pursuits absent very
precise policy language. In Larson the insured engineer ran a machine
shop within his business. Though his usual metal shop fabrication
activities involved building lifts for automobiles, his fabrication of just
one cable car system for pay was a part of his business, as defined by
Webster's New InternationalDictionary."
Insurers also fared well in enforcing other policy terms on summary
judgment. The court of appeals found that a replacement cost endorsement, requiring actual repair or replacement to occur before replacement
costs would be paid, was an express, unambiguous, and enforceable
limitation in Marchman v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co.92 The insured
homeowner claimed that O.C.G.A. section 33-32-5(a) mandated payment
of complete replacement costs even though he had not rebuilt or replaced
the destroyed structure. The carrier had paid the basic coverage of
$125,500 because the statute mandated that "'the amount of insurance
set forth in the policy relative to the building or structure shall be taken

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 638, 516 S.E.2d at 351.
Id., 516 S.E.2d at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 639-40, 516 S.E.2d at 352-53.
238 Ga. App. 674, 520 S.E.2d 45 (1999).
Id. at 675-76, 520 S.E.2d at 46-47.
171 Ga. App. 507, 320 S.E.2d 208 (1984).
238 Ga. App. at 675, 520 S.E.2d at 47.
232 Ga. App. 481, 482, 500 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1998).
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conclusively to be the value of the property."' The court reasoned that
O.C.G.A. section 33-32-5 relieved the property owner of establishing
value only with respect to the "face value of the policy" and that it did
not effect replacement cost endorsements.94
Similarly, in Williams v. Mayflower Insurance Co.,95 the court of
appeals enforced a policy term that stated "you cannot transfer your
interest under the policy to anyone else unless we agree to the transfer"
to preclude the purported assignment of the policy to the insured's
brother for the apparent purpose of collecting a tort judgment. 6 The
insured's brother attempted to argue on appeal that the nonassignability
clause was rendered nugatory because the insured paid his premiums
and, therefore, performed his obligations under the contract. The court
of appeals refused to consider this argument, however, because there
was no evidence regarding the payment of premiums, and the argument
was raised for the first time on appeal. 97 In the absence of this
argument, the nonassignability clause was upheld. 9
In GeorgiaFarm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Osting,99 the court
of appeals found that a policy exclusion for all liability under any
contract or agreement other than a written contract that directly relates
to the insured location requires that the contract only relate to the
insured location. °° Because the auto parts storage contract could have
referred to a location other than the insured location, the court reversed
the trial courts' grant of summary judgment.' ° ' These opinions reflect
enforcement of policy terms that are in the policies and stated in
sufficiently precise and understandable language.
"Bad Faith" pay penalties continue to be a popular topic. The sixtyday presuit demand, mandated by O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6, continues to
trip insureds. In Cagle v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,'o2 the court
of appeals did not excuse the insured's failure to make this requisite
demand on equitable grounds.' 3 Plaintiff was not able to comply with
the one-year suit limitation in the policy and still meet the sixty-day

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-32-5(a)) (emphasis added by court).
Id. at 484, 500 S.E.2d at 660.
238 Ga. App. 581, 519 S.E.2d 506 (1999).
Id. at 582, 519 S.E.2d at 507.
Id. at 583, 519 S.E.2d at 508.
Id.
235 Ga. App. 599, 510 S.E.2d 334 (1998).
Id. at 599, 510 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 600-01, 510 S.E.2d at 335-36.
236 Ga. App. 726, 512 S.E.2d 717 (1999).
Id. at 728, 512 S.E.2d at 719.
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statutory demand."° The court was not sympathetic to the insured's
plight, which apparently was caused by the insured's procrastination in
pursuing the claim. However, when an O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6 bad faith
penalty claim is properly orchestrated, the court of appeals will likely
enforce a finding of the same despite "'fanciful allegations of factual
conflict.'" °5 In Kastner the court of appeals heavily relied upon the
trial court's seventeen page judgment illustrating the insurer's stubbornness and willingness to find fault with minor inconsistencies in the
claim.' O6 The court revisited the general rule that "the insured bears
the burden of proving that the refusal to pay the claim was made in bad
faith" and repeated that "a defense going far enough to show reasonable
and probable
cause for making it would vindicate the good faith of the
company. " °O7 However, the court noted that "'[in reaching this
determination a court should carefully scrutinize any claim of a contest
in facts to preclude the reliance by an insurance company on fanciful
allegations of factual conflict to delay or avoid legitimate claims

payment.' "108
The mere articulation of a technical defense, as well as the materiality
of it, are important. In Florida International Indemnity Co. v. Osgood,"° the court of appeals found both as a matter of law."0 The
carrier, by retaining premiums for four and a half years after discovering
the fraud, had no policy defense. It was also not liable for bad faith
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6 because it genuinely relied on
material misrepresentations in the insurance application that it could
not rely on to avoid the claim."' The insured's explanation that the
apparent policy application was "confusing and complex" seemed to help
drive the court's opinion."'

104. Id.
105. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Kastner, 233 Ga. App. 594, 596, 504 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1998)
(quoting Rice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169, 430 S.E.2d 75, 78
(1993)) (emphasis added by court).
106. Id. at 595, 504 S.E.2d at 497.
107. Id. at 595-96, 504 S.E.2d at 498.
108. Id. at 596, 504 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting Rice, 208 Ga. App. at 169,430 S.E.2d at 78)
(emphasis added by court).
109. 233 Ga. App. 111, 503 S.E.2d 371 (1998).

110. Id. at 116, 503 S.E.2d at 375.
111. Id. at 115, 503 S.E.2d at 375.
112. Id. at 116, 503 S.E.2d at 375.
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UMBRELLA/EXCESS INSURANCE

In National Union FireInsurance Co. v. American MotoristsInsurance
Co.," 3 a unanimous supreme court decided in favor of the insured in
a contest between its insurers, who were arguing with other carriers.14 The primary carrier, American Motorists, tendered claims to
National Union, the excess insurer, by reason of alleged exhaustion of
underlying limits. When National Union later discovered and pursued
additional alleged coverage on the part of American Motorists, American
Motorists raised a series of defenses, including the excess carrier's
failure to reserve its rights and voluntary payment." 5 The court
reasoned that a public policy interest rests with the insured, not
insurance companies arguing over priority in payment amongst
themselves." 6 The "better policy is to encourage insurers to promptly
protect their insured's interests and to hold disputes amongst themselves
in abeyance.""' Therefore, the court declined to impose a notice
requirement on the reservation of rights."8 The supreme court
summarily dismissed the voluntary payment argument where the
payment was made "in good faith and under a reasonable belief that the
contract required the payment."" 9 In dicta, the supreme court considered yet another means to the same end: a direct action brought by the
excess insurer against the primary insurer arising out of intentional
misrepresentation of material fact, which would not allow the primary
insurer to raise defenses that it could otherwise assert against the
insured. 2 ° The case will likely reappear after the trial court's
consideration of the merits of the claim, perhaps under a direct action
cause of action.
When the damages sought exceed the primary coverage, the trial court
must qualify respective jurors with respect to relationship to an excess
insurer. In Lewis v. Emory University,'2' the court of appeals squarely
addressed this issue and held, adopting the reasoning of several recent
Georgia opinions, that jurors who are related to a nonparty insurance
company that may be liable for indemnification are disqualified as a

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

269 Ga. 768, 504 S.E.2d 673 (1998).
Id. at 771, 504 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 769, 504 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 770, 504 S.E.2d at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 771, 504 S.E.2d at 676.
Id., 504 S.E.2d at 675.
235 Ga. App. 811, 509 S.E.2d 635 (1998).
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matter of law. 22 These decisions extend back to the supreme court's
holding in Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb,'23 which has been interpreted as
requiring jury qualification of all insurance carriers, including a relevant
excess carrier.'2 4 What next, reinsurance?
V. MISCELLANEOUS
As class actions are increasingly utilized to address wrongful patterns
of action, the supreme court's decision in Patterman v. Travelers,
Inc.'26 will be helpful in selecting favorable venues. The Pattermans
claimed that agents of defendants churned their accounts and convinced
them to invest in mutual funds also issued by defendants. When the
mutual funds did not perform as expected, plaintiffs brought their broadbased tort claims against defendants in Richmond County.'26 The
court of appeals considered the propriety of the trial court's transfer of
the case to Gwinnett County because the trial court found that venue
was inappropriate in Richmond County under O.C.G.A. section
33-4-1(2). 1 27 In a careful and thoughtful discussion of the text and the
precedent related to subsections (2) and (4), the court of appeals held
that plaintiffs could successfully navigate around adverse precedent
under subsection (4).121 The court of appeals interpreted subsection (2)
to apply if the claim against the carrier arose out of the insurer's role as
an insurer or business as an insurer. 2 9 The court also found that the
130
solicitation of insurance was within the business of insurance.
Hence, under subsection (2), plaintiffs were not limited to restrictive
venues under other subsections but could bring suit "[in any county
where the company shall have an agent or place of doing business.
The supreme court has agreed to review this decision.
Through a group of decisions on a variety of issues, Georgia courts
have continued to defer to and support the insurance commissioner's
office. In Cerulean Companies, Inc. v. 7ller,132 the supreme court
sharply rebuffed an attempt by a disgruntled group of Blue Cross

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 812-14, 509 S.E.2d at 638-40.
178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).
Lewis, 235 Ga. App. at 812-15, 509 S.E.2d at 639-41.
235 Ga. App. 784, 510 S.E.2d 307 (1998), cert. granted.
Id. at 784-85, 510 S.E.2d at 308.
Id. at 785, 510 S.E.2d at 308-09.
Id. at 787, 510 S.E.2d at 310.
Id. at 786, 510 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. at 787, 510 S.E.2d at 309-10.
Id. at 788, 510 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(2)) (alteration in original).
271 Ga. 65, 516 S.E.2d 522 (1999).
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subscribers to sidestep their available administrative remedies."' 3
That class convinced the trial court to order Blue Cross to distribute
stock instead of other options."M The supreme court emphasized the
commissioner's expertise and statutory charge to determine "'the best
135
interests of the company, its policyholders, and the general public.'"
Available administrative remedies included seeking a hearing and a
decision under O.C.G.A. section 33-2-17, followed by an appeal to
superior court; seeking a declaratory ruling with respect to the state
regulations; or otherwise petitioning the commissioner for further relief
under O.C.G.A. section 33-13-1(4).131 Cerulean'sclear message discourages individuals from seeking judicial assistance out of turn without first
obtaining guidance from the insurance commissioner charged with
regulation and oversight.
In Smith v. Farm & Home Life Insurance Co.,'"7 the supreme court
held that the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act' 38 specifically prohibits tax commissioners from foreclosing against property to
collect delinquent taxes "'[diuring the pendency in this or any other state
of a liquidation proceeding. ' '1" 9 Additionally, in O'Neal v. Oxendine, 40 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of a judgment creditor's intervention in a rehabilitation proceeding.'' The
court applied traditional methods for the denial: first, the intervention
was untimely and not in accordance with the trial court's twenty-day
show cause order, and second, there had been no showing that the
intervenor had substantive evidence likely to affect the trial court's
decision on the merits as to whether to approve the reinsurance
agreement. 4 2 Finally, in Paulsen Street Investors v. EBCO General
Agencies, 1 a judgment creditor and assignee of the rights of Agency
Premium Finance Co. ("APF") sought the return of certain unearned
premiums that had been returned to Bill Williams, Inc., a licensed
insurance premium finance company.'" The court discussed and
dispatched a litany of technical arguments, all claiming that APF's

133. Id. at 67, 516 S.E.2d at 523-24.
134. Id. at 66, 516 S.E.2d at 523.
135. Id. at 67, 516 S.E.2d at 524 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-20-34).
136. Id. at 66-67, 516 S.E.2d at 523-24.
137. 269 Ga. 709, 506 S.E.2d 104 (1998).
138. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-37-1 to -58 (1996 & Supp. 1999).
139. 269 Ga. at 711, 506 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-37-56) (emphasis added

by court).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

237 Ga. App. 171, 514 S.E.2d 908 (1999).
Id. at 177, 514 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 175-76, 514 S.E.2d at 911-12.
237 Ga. App. 116, 514 S.E.2d 904 (1999).
Id. at 117, 514 S.E.2d at 905.
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failure to obtain the premium finance license, as required by O.C.G.A.
section 33-22-3, did not bar his attempt to recover unearned premiums. 4'5 The court noted that an assignee of a contract has no more
rights under the contract than the assignor.'
Therefore, Paulsen was
burdened with its assignor's failure to comply with the Insurance
Premium Finance Company Act.' 47 The court held that this Act was
intended for the regulation of business in the public interest rather than
merely for revenue purposes.'
Hence, it was necessary for APF to
comply with the Act while conducting business in Georgia.'
The
court discussed the importance of the statutory scheme and the need for
licensure and regulation and also observed that "the strict rule barring
recovery 'has been held to be necessary to compel compliance with a
licensure requirement.'"'5 ° All these decisions emphasize the importance of initially complying with Georgia's insurance regulatory scheme.
In Brooks Brown Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Harden,'5' the court of
appeals held that another set of documents purporting to cancel an
insurance contract was ineffective.'52 This time, the carrier's purported O.C.G.A. section 33-22-13(b) ten-day notice to cancel was not proved.
The notice of cancellation purported to cancel the policy on the date of
the notice rather than on a date "after the date of53 mailing of such notice"
as required by O.C.G.A. section 33-22-13(c)(1)
In Brown v. North American Specialty Insurance Co., 15 4 the court
considered the applicability of an exclusion in an aircraft policy. 155
Specifically, the policy stipulated that the pilot must be licensed and
qualified for all segments of the flight involved; yet the pilot's certificate
contained a limitation as to multi-engine aircraft and rated him only for
Visual Flight Rules.'5 6 After extensive discussion of the applicable
facts, the court observed that the insurance contract was only temporarily suspended by the violation of a stipulation."' If no loss is caused

145. Id. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 905-06.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 119, 514 S.E.2d at 906-07.
148. Id. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906.
149. Id. at 119, 514 S.E.2d 906-07.
150. Id. at 119-20, 514 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting Management Compensation
Group/Southeast v. United Sec. Employee Programs, 194 Ga. App. 99, 389 S.E.2d 525
(1989)).
151. 236 Ga. App. 781, 513 S.E.2d 755 (1999).
152. Id. at 784, 513 S.E.2d at 757.
153. Id. at 783, 513 S.E.2d at 756.
154. 235 Ga. App. 299, 508 S.E.2d 741 (1998).
155. Id. at 299, 508 S.E.2d at 742.
156. Id. at 299-300, 508 S.E.2d at 743.
157. Id. at 303, 508 S.E.2d at 745.
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by or attributed to the violation of the stipulation, the insurer is not

relieved from liability.158 Given these peculiar facts, a question of fact
was presented under customary rules of interpretation. These rules
provide that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter of the
document, exclusions from coverage are strictly construed against the
insurer, and insurance contracts are to be read in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the insured, when possible.'59
VI.
A.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Policy Construction

As in prior years, a significant number of cases decided by Georgia's
appellate courts addressed the issue of whether the policy afforded
coverage. The often-used vehicle for determining construction of the
policy and determining coverage was the declaratory judgment action.
1. Permissive User/Named Driver Exclusion. One of several
topics addressed by the courts in declaratory judgment actions concerned
coverage for alleged nonpermissive use and the named driver exclusion.
Thomas v. InternationalIndemnity Co.6 ° arose out of an automobile
collision involving Thomas and a vehicle operated by Finney and owned
by Lipford d/b/a P&L Motors, who was International's insured. At the
time of the collision, the vehicle was being repaired by Burlie d/b/a
Charles Auto Repair, for whom Finney was an intermittent employee.
Thomas initially sued Burlie d/b/a Charles Auto Repair and Finney,
neither of whom answered, and obtained default judgments. Thomas
then claimed that International's policy of insurance for Lipford covered
the collision, and International filed a declaratory judgment action. The
trial court held that International was obligated to provide neither
liability coverage nor a defense, and Thomas appealed.' 6 '
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling for several reasons.
First, the court of appeals found that the policy at issue required the
insured's permission and that the facts of the case failed to establish
that "Lipford or anyone from P&L Motors gave Finney permission to
drive." 6 ' Thomas argued, however, that the default judgment against
Burlie conclusively established that Finney was driving with permission.
Although Burlie was collaterally estopped from denying that he gave

158. Id.
159. Id. at 303-04, 508 S.E.2d at 745.

160. 232 Ga. App. 574, 502 S.E.2d 512 (1998).
161. Id. at 575, 502 S.E.2d at 513.
162. Id.
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Finney permission, coverage was predicated on permission from the
insured, P&L Motors, to the operator, Finney, which was a fact not
proven. 163
The court also noted that the policy further limited coverage to garage
operations located at P&L Motors' address."6
Because the record
revealed that P&L Motors and Charles Auto Repair were totally
separate entities and that Charles Auto Repair was not P&L Motors'
garage operation, there was no coverage. 65
Similarly, in Shield Insurance Co. v. Smiley," the court of appeals
found that the policy excluded coverage because the operator was driving
the insured vehicle with neither express nor implied permission.'6 7
The specific policy provision stated that "'[wie do not provide Liability
Coverage for any person ... [u]sing a vehicle without the express or
implied permission of the 'named insured' [i.e., Addie Smiley].'"'65
The facts revealed that Sharpe did not have permission to drive
Smiley's automobile. Sharpe knew she did not have permission because
she only had a learner's permit and the owner, Smiley, was out of town.
Although Smiley subsequently testified that had she been asked she
might have permitted Sharpe to use the car, the court of appeals noted
that "this testimony does not change the fact that Sharpe
drove the car
69
without permission, and indeed in violation of law."
The insurer in Peachtree Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kim 7 was not
as fortunate. The court of appeals found coverage on the basis that the
policy was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 7 '
The policy excluded "'[biodily injury or property damage caused by your
insured car when it is driven, operated or used with your permission by
a person whom you know: ... d. Has a revoked driver's license.'"'72

163. Id.
164. Id. at 575-76, 502 S.E.2d at 513.
165. Id. at 575, 502 S.E.2d at 513.
166. 234 Ga. App. 806, 508 S.E.2d 183 (1998).
167. Id. at 809, 508 S.E.2d at 185.
168. Id. at 807, 508 S.E.2d at 184 (second and third alterations by court).
169. Id. at 808, 508 S.E.2d at 184.
170. 236 Ga. App. 689, 512 S.E.2d 46 (1999).
171. Id. at 690, 512 S.E.2d at 47-48. The court of appeals cited the often-used
proposition:
if a provision of an insurance contract is susceptible of two or more constructions,
even when the multiple constructions are all logical and reasonable, it is
ambiguous and the statutory rules of contract construction will be applied ...

[and] the contract will be construed strictly against the insurer/drafter and in
favor of the insured.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 689, 512 S.E.2d at 47 (emphasis added).
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The policy defined "you" and "your" as the named insured.'73 Further,
the policy provided coverage for "[the named insured] ...with respect
to an accident involving your insured car."'74 Prior to the collision,
Kim's previously valid driver's license was revoked.'7 5 The exclusion
applied when the insured gave permission to a person whom the insured
knew had a revoked driver's license. Peachtree therefore attempted to
invoke the exclusion by arguing that "it [was] implicit in the policy that
the driver/insured must [have been] licensed."' 76 The court rejected
this argument and found the exclusion to be ambiguous because there
was a fact question as to whether "one [may] give oneself permission to
drive without a license so as to trigger the exclusion."'7 7
In a declaratory judgment action focused on a named driver exclusion,
Adams v. Atlanta Casualty Co.,' the court of appeals found that when
the named driver exclusion is clear, unambiguous, and supported by
consideration, it is enforceable and does not violate public policy or
compulsory insurance laws.' 79
Mr. and Mrs. Adams obtained automobile insurance coverage from
Atlanta Casualty, and the insurance application contained a named
driver exclusion agreement. There were two separate places on the
application where the names of their children appear as excluded
drivers. Further, Mrs. Adams testified it was her intent to exclude their
son from coverage and it was her understanding that he had been
excluded. Consequently, by excluding coverage for their children, Mr.
and Mrs. Adams obtained a policy from Atlanta Casualty at a reduced
premium is
A declaratory judgment action arose after the Adams' son was involved
in an automobile accident." 1 Arguing for coverage, the policyholder
contended that the Adams' son was a permissive driver, but the court
rejected this argument because the policyholder could not effectively
revoke a previously agreed to exclusion by asserting that the Adams' son
was a permissive user entitled to coverage.' 82
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 690, 512 S.E.2d at 48.
177. Id. at 689, 512 S.E.2d at 47.
178. 235 Ga. App. 288, 509 S.E.2d 66 (1998).
179. Id. at 290, 509 S.E.2d at 68 (citing Ison v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 230 Ga.
App. 554, 555, 496 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1998)); see also Fountain v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 204 Ga.
App. 165, 166, 419 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1992).
180. 235 Ga. App. at 289, 509 S.E.2d at 67.
181. Id. at 288-89, 509 S.E.2d at 67.
182. Id. at 290, 509 S.E.2d at 68 (citing Ison, 230 Ga. App. at 556, 496 S.E.2d at 479-
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2. Fraud in Application Must Be Material. There were two
decisions during this survey period involving declaratory judgment
actions in which the question of coverage focused upon fraud or a
material misrepresentation in the application. In Patriot General
Insurance Co. v. Millis,"s the court of appeals found coverage to exist,
notwithstanding the fact that an agent of Patriot General made
fraudulent misrepresentations in the application for insurance coverage,
which Patriot General accepted without knowledge of the fraud." s
The court of appeals noted, however, that the agent made the misrepresentations, not the applicant."l 5 Although Patriot General had taken
steps to revoke the agent's appointment during the transaction between
18 6
the agent and the applicant, there was still an agency relationship.
In an action on a contract of insurance, the insurance company is
generally considered estopped to deny liability on any matter arising
out of the fraud, misconduct, or negligence of an agent of the company
[T]he insurer is estopped to assert the falsity of answers to
....
questions contained in an application for insurance or the policy itself,
where such false answers are inserted by the insurer's agent to whom
the applicant for insurance gave correct answers or information. 187
The court noted that because the applicant provided truthful answers
and did not participate in providing any misrepresentations to Patriot
General, he must not suffer the consequences of the fraudulent
application.'88
Further, Patriot General initially accepted the policy application and
the premium payments and issued a policy."9 Consequently, the
policy afforded coverage because "'[tihe principal shall be bound by all
of the acts of his agent when within the scope of [her] authority; if the
agent shall exceed [her] authority, the principal may not ratify in part
and repudiate in part; he shall adopt either the whole or none.'"'"
In Thompson v. Permanent General Assurance Corp., 9 ' Thompson
completed an insurance application, but instead of listing his fifteen-

183.

233 Ga. App. 867, 506 S.E.2d 145 (1998).

184. Id. at 868, 506 S.E.2d at 146.
185. Id.
186.
187.
79, 82,
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 869-71, 506 S.E.2d at 147-48.
Id. at 870, 506 S.E.2d at 147-48 (quoting Stillson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Ga.
42 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1947)) (citation and punctuation omitted by court).
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 868-69, 506 S.E.2d at 146-47.
Id. at 869, 506 S.E.2d at 147 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-6-51) (second and third

alterations by court).
191.

238 Ga. App. 450, 519 S.E.2d 249 (1999).
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year-old daughter as an unlicensed driver residing at home, Thompson
inserted "none" in the space asking for other persons living in the
household fourteen years old or older. Permanent General Assurance
Corp. ("PGAC") attempted to use
this false statement as a basis for
192
denying coverage to Thompson.

PGAC, however, failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that the
omission on the application would have effected PGAC's decision to
accept the risk at the premium stated. PGAC submitted no evidence
regarding the effect of this information on either insuring Thompson or
insuring him at the premium quoted in September 1995.193 The court
determined that in the absence of evidence of misrepresentation material
to the insurer's acceptance of the terms of the policy, the insurer could
not void the policy. 94 In fact, the court noted that the evidence
actually disputed the materiality of the omission.'95 Prior to the
accident, the agent was told of the daughter's existence and desire to be
placed on the policy when it was renewed. Thompson paid the
additional premium, and PGAC unquestioningly renewed the policy with
the daughter as a covered driver.'9 6
3. Ambiguity Defeats Insurer. Ambiguity within an insurance
policy was also the basis on which the insurer in American Southern
Insurance Co. v. Abbensett 9 7 was obligated to afford coverage to its
insured, the State of Georgia.' 98 The policy extended coverage to
"'[a]ny other person who is not a State Employee while using a vehicle
with authorization, provided his/her actual operation or (if he/she is not
operating) his/her other actual use is within the scope of such authorization. ' "" The operator of the bus was Abbensett, an employee of
Atlanta Transportation Systems, Inc., ("ATS"), which contracted with
Fulton County to provide drivers for county buses. American Southern
argued that although ATS was authorized to use the bus, it was a

192. Id. at 450, 519 S.E.2d at 250.
193. Id. at 451, 519 S.E.2d at 251.
194. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7(b); Taylor v. Georgia Int'l Life Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App.
341, 342, 427 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1993)).
195. Id. at 451-52, 519 S.E.2d at 251.
196. Id. The court of appeals cited PatriotGeneral, 233 Ga. App. at 870, 506 S.E.2d
at 147, for the proposition that the agent's knowledge is imputed to the insurer. 238 Ga.
App. at 452, 519 S.E.2d at 251. The court thus reversed the grant of summary judgment
to PGAC on the basis that (1) the misrepresentation may have been material, and (2)
PGAC may have waived this coverage defense. Id. PGAC failed to return the initial
premium and further treated the policy as valid when it issued a renewal policy. Id.
197. 232 Ga. App. 16, 501 S.E.2d 53 (1998).

198. Id. at 20-21, 501 S.E.2d at 56.
199. Id. at 18, 501 S.E.2d at 55 (alteration by court).
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corporation and could not be considered a person under the policy; thus,
coverage could not extend to ATS and Abbensett. The policy failed to
define "person" explicitly; in fact, under "persons insured," the policy
listed both individuals and corporate entities.200
The court noted that "this ambiguity must be construed against
American pursuant to the standard rules of construction, and ATS
cannot be excluded from coverage on the grounds that it is not a
person."2 ' In addition, the court of appeals noted that prior to this
accident, American Southern had paid prior claims for accidents
involving ATS drivers who were operating vehicles owned by the
State.20 2
American has waived any right to rely on such exclusions by previously
paying similar, though less expensive, claims. "While waiver or
estoppel may not be used to enlarge the coverage contained in a policy
of insurance, nevertheless, an insurer may waive any provision in an
insurance policy inserted for its benefit, and may waive any condition
203
or limitation in the policy upon which it could otherwise rely."
4. Priority of Coverage. Priority of coverage was the subject of a
declaratory judgment action in A. Atlanta Auto Save v. Generali-U.S.
Branch,2°4 a case of first impression concerning the scope of the
conditional exemption contained in O.C.G.A. section 40-9-102. That
statute provides an automobile insurance requirement exemption for a
U-drive-it owner or rental car agency when the renter presents
verification of liability insurance coverage.20 5 Both the court of appeals
and the supreme court concluded, however, that the car rental agency,
the
Auto Save, could not avail itself of the exemption provided under
2 °6
primary.
coverage
insurance
Save's
Auto
rendering
thus
statute,
In reaching its holding, the supreme court made two critical decisions.
First, a car rental agency loses the statutory exemption provided by
O.C.G.A. section 40-9-102 when it is later determined that the renter did
not have insurance.2 07 In this case, the renter provided information
suggesting she had coverage with Southern General, but after the
accident it was learned that she canceled the policy three weeks prior to

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 18-19, 501 S.E.2d at 53-55.
Id. at 19, 501 S.E.2d at 55.
Id., 501 S.E.2d at 55-56.
Id., 501 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Sargent v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Ga. App. 863, 865,

303 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).

204. 270 Ga. 757, 514 S.E.2d 651 (1999).
205.

O.C.G.A. § 40-9-102 (1997).

206. 270 Ga. at 760, 514 S.E.2d at 654.
207. Id. at 759, 514 S.E.2d at 653.
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renting the vehicle. °8 Second, the fact that the actual driver of the
rental vehicle had separate insurance at the time of the accident did not
preclude Auto Save from being primary.0 9

The court noted that

O.C.G.A. section 40-9-102 focuses on the "renter of the vehicle, not the
operator,authorized or not, inasmuch as the relationship with the rental
agency is a matter of contract."210 The operator was not a party to the
rental contract, and therefore, even though the operator may be liable
in tort, the priority of coverage issue was between the renter's insurance
carrier and the insurer of the rental vehicle.2 11
5.
Trucking Decisions. There were three trucking-related
insurance coverage cases decided during the survey period. In Guinn
Transport, Inc. v. Canal Insurance Co.,212 the court of appeals held
that Canal's occupant exclusion was enforceable and was not contrary
to public policy but that it exceeded the minimum limits promulgated by
the Georgia Public Service Commission ("PSC") and that the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was not applicable.2 1 First, Canal
issued a uniform motor carrier liability endorsement and thereby
effectively "amend[ed] the policy to provide insurance for automobile
bodily injury and property damage liability in accordance with the
provisions of such law or regulations to the extent of the coverage and
limits of liability required thereby."214 Second, O.C.G.A. section 46-712 authorized the PSC to determine the amount and limitations of such
financial responsibility, which the PSC determined to be $100,000 per
person and $300,000 per occurrence pursuant to Rule 1-8-1_.01.215
Finally, contrary to Canal's argument, the court of appeals held that the
injured passengers were within the class of persons intended to be
protected by the statute. 216 PSC Rule 1-8-1-.01 defined the class of
persons protected as "'any person who sustains actionable injury or21loss
7
as a result of the negligence of the common carrier or its agents.'"
The supreme court addressed a certified question from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in DeHart v. Liberty
208. Id. at 757-58, 514 S.E.2d at 652.
209. Id. at 760, 514 S.E.2d at 654.
210. Id. at 758, 514 S.E.2d at 653.
211. Id.
212. 234 Ga. App. 235, 507 S.E.2d 144 (1998).
213. Id. at 236-37, 507 S.E.2d at 145.
214. Id. at 236, 507 S.E.2d at 145 (alteration by court).
215. Id. at 237, 507 S.E.2d at 145 (citing Kinard v. National Indem. Co., 225 Ga. App.
176, 177 n.2, 483 S.E.2d 664, 665 n.2 (1997), affd, Ross v. Stephens, 269 Ga. 266, 496
S.E.2d 705 (1998)).
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Ross, 269 Ga. at 267, 496 S.E.2d at 707).
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Mutual Insurance Co.218 The questions certified were "whether the
Georgia Public Service Commission's 'continuous coverage' provision
applies outside the State of Georgia and whether state law permits the
stacking of a motor carrier's liability insurance policies."219 The
supreme court held that notwithstanding the expiration of its policy
prior to the accident, Liberty Mutual was required to provide coverage
because it failed to notify the PSC of the expiration of the policy prior to
the loss.22 °
Citing the intent of the Motor Carrier Act and PSC regulations to
protect members of the general public against injuries caused by the
negligence of a Georgia motor common carrier, the supreme court
concluded "that the continuous coverage provision applies to motor
vehicle collisions that occur outside the State of Georgia."22 ' The
supreme court also noted that Liberty Mutual's policy afforded coverage
for accidents throughout the United States.222
Aside from the specific questions answered by the supreme court,
DeHart highlights another and perhaps more significant fact-the high
cost of failing to follow specific filing provisions of the PSC. Liberty
Mutual's policy expired, and the insured even obtained subsequent
coverage, but the failure of Liberty Mutual to comply with simple but
specific filing requirements maintained coverage under the policy and
permitted another avenue of recovery for the plaintiff.
On the issue of continuous coverage, the supreme court determined
that Liberty Mutual's failure to comply with PSC regulations and to file
a Form K canceling the policy prior to the collision rendered Liberty
Mutual liable to the DeHarts.223 Citing Smith v. National Union,224
the supreme court noted that "'[u]ntil proper notice is given to the
commission, the policy is effective for the benefit of the public.'"22 5

218. 270 Ga. 381, 509 S.E.2d 913 (1998).
219. Id. at 381, 509 S.E.2d at 914.
220. Id. at 387, 509 S.E.2d at 917.
221. Id. at 385, 509 S.E.2d at 916.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 387, 509 S.E.2d at 917.
224. 122 Ga. App. 622, 631-32, 178 S.E.2d 268, 275 (1970). "[T]he Court held that the
insurance company that had not canceled its certified coverage at the time of the collision,
despite the expiration of the policy, was a proper defendant in a wrongful death action."
DeHart, 270 Ga. at 385, 509 S.E.2d at 917.
225. 127 Ga. App. at 753, 195 S.E.2d at 206. Liberty Mutual initially filed Form K in
November 1986 notifying the PSC that the policy would cancel in 30 days but prior to the
expiration of the 30 days filed Form E reinstating the policy. 270 Ga. at 382, 507 S.E.2d
at 914.
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The direct action statute and the filing of forms was the subject of the
third appellate decision involving motor common carriers. McAdams v.
United States Fire Insurance Co.22 stands for the proposition that a
direct action pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 46-7-58(e) is precluded if
neither the policy providing liability insurance coverage nor the forms
prescribed and approved by the PSC pursuant to Rule 1-8-1-.07(a) are
filed with and approved by the PSC.227
6. Exclusion Regarding Medical Payment Benefits. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Walker"2 addressed the issue of
whether State Farm's policy with Walker could exclude medical payment
benefits based upon Walker's settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer.
Walker claimed medical expenses totaling $10,671.29 for injuries
sustained in an accident with a Southern General insured. State Farm
initially denied payment for treatment of his knee injury but paid
$2,000.50 for treatment for his neck and back injuries. Southern
General subsequently settled the tort suit with Walker for $15,000, and
Walker then filed suit against State Farm for failure to pay the total
amount of medical expenses. State Farm's medical payments coverage
contained an exclusion precluding coverage for medical expenses when
the injured person has been paid damages for bodily injury in an amount
equal to or greater than the total reasonable and necessary medical
expenses incurred by the injured person.229
Noting that Walker's settlement with Southern General clearly
exceeded the total claimed medical expenses, the court of appeals
determined State Farm owed nothing.230 "In construing this language,
we must bear in mind the general principle that we cannot construe
clear and unambiguous language in an insurance contract to expand
coverage beyond its plain terms."231 Also, the court distinguished this
case from the complete compensation rule in subrogation cases.232 The
court noted that in this case, State Farm was not seeking reimburse-

226. 234 Ga. App. 324, 506 S.E.2d 679 (1998).
227. Id. at 325, 506 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Canal Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 222 Ga. App. 539,
540, 474 S.E.2d 732, 733 (1996); O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(c); Ross v. Stephens, 269 Ga. 266, 267,
496 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1998)).
228. 234 Ga. App. 101, 505 S.E.2d 828 (1998).
229. Id. at 101-02, 505 S.E.2d at 829-30.
230. Id. at 102, 505 S.E.2d at 830.
231. Id. (citing Bold Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 382, 384, 454
S.E.2d 582, 584 (1995)).
232. Id. at 102-03, 505 S.E.2d at 830 (citing Duncan v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 267 Ga.
646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997); O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (both requiring an insured to be
completely compensated for his losses before the insurer can exercise a right of subrogation
or reimbursement)).
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ment for sums paid to Walker; rather, it was attempting to enforce an
exclusion that precluded coverage for the medical payments benefit. 33
"The parties here exercised their freedom of contract by expressly and
unambiguously contracting against double recovery,... [and therefore]
[w]e find no reason in this case to interfere with the right of these
parties to exclude coverage by express agreement."2"
7. Duty to Defend. An insurer's duty to defend was addressed in
two appellate cases, Scruggs v.International Indemnity Co., 23 5 and
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v.State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.236 In Cotton States the court of appeals held that an
insurer does not waive its right to contest coverage owed to its insured
merely by paying plaintiff's property damage. 237 The court noted the
threshold question was whether the insurer "had undertaken a defense
of a tort action without reserving its rights to contest coverage." 238
Because Cotton States merely settled the property damage before
learning of facts that contested coverage, the coverage defense was not
waived. 3 9
The issue in Scruggs was whether an insurer is required to undertake
a defense of its insured when the policy clearly states that payment of
the liability insurance limits concludes any duty to defend or settle when
the liability insurance limits are exhausted. 240 The appellate court not
only held that such language absolved the insurer from a duty to defend,
but it also held that International followed the proper course of action
in determining the coverage question.24 1
International issued a
reservation of rights letter and assigned defense counsel pending
resolution of the coverage question. Scruggs argued unsuccessfully that
such conduct obligated International to continue its defense of
Scruggs.242
8. Proving Property Damage. The court of appeals held in Canal
Insurance Co. v. Tulles24 3 that failure to offer any evidence of the fair

233. Id. at 102, 505 S.E.2d at 830.
234. Id. at 103, 505 S.E.2d at 831.
235. 233 Ga. App. 772, 505 S.E.2d 267 (1998).
236. 235 Ga. App. 510, 510 S.E.2d 78 (1998).

237. Id. at 512, 510 S.E.2d at 80.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 233 Ga. App. at 772, 505 S.E.2d at 267.

241. Id. at 773, 505 S.E.2d at 268.
242. Id.
243. 237 Ga. App. 515, 515 S.E.2d 649 (1999).
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market value of a vehicle immediately before a collision, even when
seeking recovery for the reasonable value of repairs made necessary by
2
the collision, will result in a directed verdict for the defendant. "
Consequently, when seeking recovery for property damage, even when
seeking recovery only for the reasonable value of repairs arising from the
collision, a party must establish proof of the fair market value of the
vehicle immediately prior to the collision because the aggregate amount
of the various items of damages sought must
not exceed the fair market
2 45
value of the automobile prior to the injury.
9. Excess Verdict. In a case involving an unusual effort to recover
an excess verdict, the court of appeals in Metropolitan Property &
CasualtyInsurance Co. v. CruMp24 determined that an individual who
has recovered a judgment against a tortfeasor may not garnish the
tortfeasor's unasserted and unassigned claim against the tortfeasor's
own insurance company for failure to settle within the policy limits.247
Crump obtained an excess verdict against Smith, Metropolitan's insured,
and filed a garnishment action against Metropolitan seeking to garnish
Smith's potential bad faith claim against Metropolitan. 2" The court
of appeals granted Metropolitan's application for interlocutory appeal
because the trial court failed to dismiss the garnishment on 2the
49 basis
that Crump lacked standing to assert Smith's inchoate claim.
The court of appeals held that there was "no fiduciary relationship or
privity of contract existing between [Metropolitan] and [Crump]."250
Consequently, Crump lacked standing to bring a garnishment claim
against Metropolitan, and the court of appeals reversed the decision
of
251
the trial court and granted Metropolitan's motion to dismiss.
B.

Uninsured Motorist Cases
The two primary areas of attention during the survey period were
limited releases and eyewitness corroboration required for uninsured
motorist coverage. The appellate courts also addressed subrogation for

244. Id. at 516, 515 S.E.2d at 650.
245. Id. (citing Sykes v. Sin, 229 Ga. App. 155, 155-56, 493 S.E.2d 571, 573-74 (1997);
Myers v. Thornton, 224 Ga. App. 326, 327, 480 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1997); Archer v. Monroe,
165 Ga. App. 724, 726, 302 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1983)).
246. 237 Ga. App. 96, 513 S.E.2d 33 (1999).
247. Id. at 97, 513 S.E.2d at 34.
248. Id. at 96, 513 S.E.2d at 34.
249. Id., 513 S.E.2d at 33.
250. Id. at 97, 513 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 344, 43

S.E.2d 282, 284 (1947)).
251. Id. at 99, 513 S.E.2d at 35.
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uninsured motorist payments and the right of an uninsured motorist
carrier to participate in the defense of the tortfeasor. Finally, the court
of appeals addressed the right of a mother to recover for mental distress
associated with the death of her unborn child.
1. Limited Release.

It is well settled under Georgia law that

the injured party must establish legal liability of the defendant driver
of an underinsured vehicle before recovery is allowed under the driver's
uninsured motorist coverage. Legal liability is defined as the securing
of a judgment against the underinsured motorist ...."A judgment
obtained against the uninsured motorist is a condition precedent to
recovery against an automobile liability carrier under the provisions of
uninsured motorist coverage."252
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41.1 permits an injured party to execute a limited
liability release that relieves the tortfeasor of personal liability to the
injured party but maintains the cause of action against the uninsured
motorist carrier.2 5 "'The limited release therefore does not affect the
injured party's ability to obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor, but
merely limits the tortfeasor's personal liability in the amount of
available insurance coverage.'"2
This limited release statute proved to be a minefield for several
plaintiffs during the survey period. Although the provisions of the
statute are clear and specific, many plaintiffs and their counsel faltered
and consequently lost coverage from their uninsured motorist carrier.
The problem that arose for plaintiffs in Kent v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.255 was that, in addition to executing a
limited liability release pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41.1 when
they settled with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, plaintiffs also
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claims against the tortfeasor.
The effect of this dismissal was that plaintiffs were prevented from
securing a judgment and establishing the tortfeasor's liability."'
"Because the Kents cannot determine Holloway's legal liability, they are

252. Kent v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Ga. App. 564, 565, 504 S.E.2d 710,
712-13 (1998) (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Echols, 145 Ga. App. 112, 113, 243 S.E.2d
88, 89-90 (1978) (citations omitted)).
253. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (1996).
254. Kent, 233 Ga. App. at 565, 504 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Rodgers v. St. Paul Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 228 Ga. App. 499, 501, 492 S.E.2d 268, 269-70 (1997)).
255. 233 Ga. App. 564, 504 S.E.2d 710 (1998).
256. Id. at 564-65, 504 S.E.2d at 712-13.
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barred 25from
recovering underinsured motorist benefits from State
7
Farm."

As in Kent, plaintiff in Cook v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.258 lost the opportunity to obtain uninsured motorist
coverage when he signed a release that did not comport with O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41. 1.259 Plaintiff signed a document entitled "General
Release" and subtitled "Release of All Claims." The language of the
release stated that plaintiff was fully compensated for all claims, and it
released, acquitted, and forever discharged the tortfeasor and the
tortfeasor's insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment for
Crawford, the underinsured motorist, and the two insurers, State Farm
and Progressive.26 °
The problem that arose for Cook was that the release clearly absolved
the tortfeasor, without reservation, of any and all liability.261 Citing

Kent, the court of appeals held that plaintiff was precluded from
establishing the conditions precedent for recovery against the uninsured
motorist carrier; thus, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for State Farm.262
A slightly different twist to the limited liability release statute was the
subject of Daniels v. Johnson.263 In Daniels the supreme court confronted the conflict between O.C.G.A. section 33-34-3(a)(2), the "deemer"
2
statute, and O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41.1, the limited release statute. 6
Daniels was injured in an accident with Johnson, who was covered
personally by a $10,000 liability policy and whose rental car was covered
by a $10,000 liability policy. Daniels settled with Johnson's two insurers
for $10,000 each and executed a limited liability release. When Daniels
pursued a claim against his uninsured motorist carrier, the trial court
granted the uninsured motorist carrier's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that Daniels failed to exhaust all available coverage, a
condition precedent to the uninsured motorist claim. The uninsured
motorist carrier relied upon O.C.G.A. section 33-34-3(a)(2), which
provides that all policies of insurance are deemed to have minimum
limits of $15,000.265

257.
258.

Id. at 565, 504 S.E.2d 713.
237 Ga. App. 400, 514 S.E.2d 48 (1999).

259.

Id. at 401, 514 S.E.2d at 50.

260.

Id., 514 S.E.2d at 49.

261. Id.
262. Id. at 403, 514 S.E.2d at 51.
263. 270 Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998).
264. Id. at 289, 509 S.E.2d at 42.
265. Id. at 289-90, 509 S.E.2d at 42.
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The supreme court reversed the trial court and the court of appeals,
holding that "if the plaintiff settles for the limits of the policy as stated
in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41.1, the plaintiff may pursue its uninsured
motorist claim." 2 " The supreme court further stated, however, "[t]o
balance the equities we also hold that the uninsured motorist carrier
may plead and prove the availability of coverage under the deemer
statute and thus have its liability
reduced by the amount the plaintiff
267
waived under that statute."
Frequently, the uninsured motorist carrier is served along with the
tortfeasor when suit is initially filed to protect against a potential
uninsured motorist claim. Under this scenario, the uninsured motorist
carrier will often execute a consent dismissal with the plaintiff because
it is determined at that time that no uninsured motorist claim exists.
The terms and conditions of the consent dismissal often permit the
plaintiff to renew the uninsured motorist claim against the uninsured
motorist carrier, but in exchange for the agreement, the uninsured
motorist carrier is afforded the opportunity to defend a renewed suit on
all issues of liability and damages.
In Terry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 261 the supreme court analyzed the effect of such a consent dismissal. 2 9 Although recognizing that the consent dismissal altered State Farm's
obligations to the detriment of Terry, the supreme court held that
the agreement was a result of negotiations between the parties prior
to the dismissal of State Farm from the case and State Farm does not
seek to go beyond the terms of the consent dismissal to challenge any
other rights provided Terry under the [uninsured motorist carrier]
statute. Rather it seeks only to enforce that express provision of the
consent dismissal granting State Farm the opportunity to defend the
case on its merits.270
Because the consent dismissal was unambiguous and did not conflict
with the uninsured motorist statute, O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11, the
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals remand for trial "to allow
State Farm the opportunity to defend
against liability and damages," as
27
provided in the consent dismissal. '

266. Id. at 291, 509 S.E.2d at 43.

267. Id.
268. 269 Ga. 777, 504 S.E.2d 194 (1998).

269. Id. at 778-79, 504 S.E.2d at 195-96.
270. Id. at 778, 504 S.E.2d at 195.
271. Id. at 779, 504 S.E.2d at 196.
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2. Corroboration and Uninsured Motorist Coverage. Under
Georgia law, a party may recover for damages received in an automobile
accident even if the owner or operator of the motor vehicle is unknown.
The party seeking recovery for such damages is required, however, to
establish either (1) physical contact between the injured party's vehicle
and the vehicle operated by the unknown person, or (2) produce an
eyewitness to the occurrence who can corroborate the description by the
injured party of how the occurrence occurred.272
During the survey period, there were two decisions involving the
interpretation of the eyewitness corroboration requirement, Lovelady v.

Alfa Mutual Insurance Co. 273 and Painter v. Continental Insurance
Co. 274 In Lovelady the issue was whether the claimant must be an

eyewitness to the unknown vehicle's involvement to satisfy the
requirements of the uninsured motorist statute.275 In Painter the
uninsured motorist carrier attempted to preclude coverage to the injured
party, claiming that the independent eyewitness corroboration was
inconsistent with the testimony of the claimant and that, therefore,
construing the conflicting testimony against plaintiff, the suit must be
dismissed.
In Lovelady the court of appeals noted that
[i]f the General Assembly had intended to require [eyewitness
testimony by the claimant] it could have so specified. The description
need not be in the claimant's testimony but may also be in the
pleadings, as in this case, although merely filing suit against John Doe
does not constitute a description by the claimant of how the occurrence
occurred.277
The court also noted that the purpose of the statute was to preclude the
recovery of false claims, not "the refusal of relief to innocent motorists
who describe in allegations and are able to prove that they were injured
because of the actions of unidentified drivers."278
The argument against coverage in Painterinvolved alleged conflicts
between plaintiff's deposition testimony and the eyewitness' affidavit

272. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (Supp. 1999).
273. 233 Ga. App. 117, 503 S.E.2d 349 (1998).
274. 233 Ga. App. 436, 504 S.E.2d 285 (1998).

275. 233 Ga. App at 119, 503 S.E.2d at 351.
276. 233 Ga. App. at 437, 504 S.E.2d at 287.
277. 233 Ga. App. at 120, 503 S.E.2d at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alterations by court).

278. Id. at 122, 503 S.E.2d at 353.
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testimony. 279 Dismissing this argument, the court of appeals noted
that "[t]he corroboration required by the eyewitness account is corroboration of that portion of the claimant's description asserting the existence
of a phantom vehicle which caused the incident; that is, existence and
causation."2 0
Any discrepancies in corroborating testimony, other
than the existence of the phantom vehicle and causation of the accident,
were the subject of witness credibility and evidentiary weight."' As
in Lovelady, the court focused on the need to create a reasonable rule
precluding fraudulent claims while allowing innocent automobile victims
coverage for damages incurred by phantom vehicles.282
3. Uninsured Motorist Subrogation. The supreme court, in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. V. Cox, 28a held that an uninsured motorist carrier pursuing subrogation must do so in the name of
its insured.2 4 State Farm paid its insured, Jacobs, $6,300 for bodily
injuries sustained in a collision that Jacobs had with Cox. State Farm
subsequently filed a subrogation action in its own name against Cox to
recover the benefits paid to Jacobs. Cox moved to dismiss the action
claiming that Jacobs, not State Farm, was the real party in interest and
that the suit should have been filed in Jacobs' name.285
State Farm argued that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(f) provided the
statutory right to proceed in its own name in subrogation actions to
recover payments made under Georgia's uninsured motorist provision.2 8' The supreme court disagreed, holding that while the statute
gives the right of subrogation to an insurer,
there is no language in the statute authorizing the insurer to bring a
subrogation action in its own name. If the legislature had intended to
grant the insurer in this situation the additional authority to bring suit
on its own
behalf against the alleged tortfeasor, it would have explicitly
28 7
done so.

4. Uninsured Motorist Carrier's Right to Defend. In Hossain
v. Nelson,2 the court of appeals held that an uninsured motorist

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

233 Ga. App. at 437-38, 504 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 439, 504 S.E.2d at 288.
Id.
Id.
271 Ga. 77, 515 S.E.2d 832 (1999).
Id. at 77, 515 S.E.2d at 833.
Id. at 77-78, 515 S.E.2d at 833.
Id. at 77, 515 S.E.2d at 833.
Id. at 79, 515 S.E.2d at 834.
234 Ga. App. 792, 507 S.E.2d 243 (1998).
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carrier who elects not to participate in the underlying trial cannot be
included on the verdict form.289 Further, even if the uninsured
motorist carrier elects not to be a named defendant, it may participate
in the defense of the tortfeasor as authorized by O.C.G.A. section 33-711.2" Nelson sued Hossain and served the uninsured motorist carrier,
State Farm. State Farm filed an answer and cross-claim against
Hossain on its own behalf but withdrew its cross-claim prior to trial.
State Farm attempted to remain active and to participate in the trial,
but the trial court disagreed and ruled that State Farm could participate
only if it was identified as a party and the jury was informed that State
Farm was the uninsured motorist carrier.29' State Farm and Hossain
stated their292objection to the court's ruling, but State Farm elected not to
be a party.
Notwithstanding this election, the verdict form identified State Farm
as an individual defendant and insinuated that Hossain was an
uninsured motorist. 293 The court of appeals found the jury verdict
form to be in error and remanded the case to the trial court.294 The
court of appeals also held that on retrial State Farm could participate
in Hossain's defense as authorized by O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(d) and
that it need not do so in its own name.295
5. Recovery for Mental Distress. In a significant decision,
Thomas v. Carter,21 the court of appeals addressed and clarified the
extent to which a woman can recover damages for mental distress
arising from the death of her unborn child. 297 The case involved an
automobile accident between Patina Thomas, who was seven months
pregnant at the time of the collision, and Jude Carter. The day
following the collision, Thomas' doctor determined that her fetus had
died, and Thomas subsequently delivered the deceased child.298
Thomas sued Carter and served her uninsured motorist carrier, State
Farm, who filed an answer in its own name. When Thomas stated in
her discovery responses that she was seeking damages for the emotional
trauma she suffered as a result of the death of her unborn child, which

289.

Id. at 793, 507 S.E.2d at 245.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id. at 792, 507 S.E.2d at 244.
Id.
Id. at 793, 507 S.E.2d at 245.
Id.
Id. at 794, 507 S.E.2d at 246.
234 Ga. App. 384, 506 S.E.2d 377 (1998).
Id. at 384, 506 S.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 384-85, 506 S.E.2d at 378.
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she contended was caused by the negligence of the tortfeasor, Carter,
State Farm filed a motion for partial summary judgment. State Farm
argued that Thomas was not entitled to recover for mental distress
suffered as a result of the death of her unborn child.299
After discussing the evolution of recovery of damages for emotional
distress, the court noted that "a mother in a negligence case may not
recover for emotional distress associated with the death of her unborn
child [unless] the mother is also injured by the same force which injures
the fetus." °0 The court reversed the trial court's judgment and held
that
[tihe injury to both the mother and the fetus was caused by the direct
force to the mother in the automobile collision which resulted in the in
utero death of the fetus. The trauma to the placenta is an injury to the
mother, not to the child. It was this injury to the mother, and not any
separate injury to the fetus, that caused the death of the fetus.3"'
Under these facts, "any emotional distress suffered by Thomas due to the
death of her unborn child was a consequential damage resulting directly
from injuries to Thomas herself."0 2
In evaluating and determining damages for emotional distress
resulting from the death of an unborn child, the significant factor is
whether the trauma causing injury to the mother similarly caused injury
to the unborn child. If there are separate causes for the injuries, there
is no recovery for emotional distress for the death of an unborn child.
VII.

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY

As with automobile liability insurance; there were a number of
appellate decisions during the survey period regarding commercial
general liability policies in which coverage was a contested issue. In
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Metro Courier Corp.,3°3 the
court of appeals analyzed the issue of whether the underlying facts gave
rise to a proper declaratory judgment and whether dismissing a
declaratory judgment action operates as an adjudication of the merits
such that the dismissal is with prejudice.0 4 The court held that the
insurer waived its right to pursue a declaratory judgment action because
(1) it wrote the insured a letter rejecting the insured's demand for

299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id. at 386-87, 506 S.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 387, 506 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 387-88, 506 S.E.2d at 380.

303.

234 Ga. App. 670, 507 S.E.2d 525 (1998).

304. Id. at 670, 507 S.E.2d at 526.
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coverage, (2) it failed to provide defense counsel in the underlying tort
action, and (3) because judgment was entered in the damage action. °5
A declaratory judgment action is not proper "where the rights of the
parties have already accrued and there are no circumstances showing
any necessity for a determination of the dispute to guide and protect the
plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of
some future act or conduct." 30 6 The court did, however, reverse the
dismissal with prejudice because the dismissal was for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, which does not operate as an adjudication on the
merits.0 7
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify were once again
reasserted as separate and distinct duties in Utica Mutual InsuranceCo.
v. Kelly & Cohen, Inc. °8 Utica relied on an exclusion in its policy in
denying coverage to its insured. 30 9 However, the court of appeals
determined that the complaint alleged one tort theory of recovery that
arguably fell within the exclusion, but it adopted an alternative theory
of recovery that did not fall within the terms of the exclusion, thereby
mandating coverage.3 10
Consequently, when the complaint shows
potential coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend even though
ultimately the evidence at trial may establish that there is no duty to
pay.311
There were three cases during the survey period that addressed policy
exclusions. An assault and battery exclusion was the subject of review
in Eady v. Capitol Indemnity Corp.,312 in which two innocent victims
of a shooting sued the bar where the shooting occurred. The insurer,
Capitol Indemnity, relied upon its assault and battery exclusion in its
declaratory judgment action. Because the shooter, Roberts, pleaded
guilty to aggravated assault, the trial court concluded that any alleged
injury arose out of an assault and came within the policy's assault and
battery exclusion. 13 The policy defined assault as a "willful attempt
or offer with force or violence to harm or hurt a person without the
actual doing of the harm or hurt." 14

305. Id. at 671-72, 507 S.E.2d at 527-28.
306. Id. at 671, 507 S.E.2d at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Id. at 673-74, 507 S.E.2d at 529.
308. 233 Ga. App. 555, 504 S.E.2d 510 (1998).
309. Id. at 555, 504 S.E.2d at 511.
310. Id. at 555-56, 504 S.E.2d at 511-12.
311. Id. at 556, 504 S.E.2d at 512 (citing Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am.
Veterans, 268 Ga. 564, 564-65, 490 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1997)).
312. 232 Ga. App. 711, 502 S.E.2d 514 (1998).
313. Id. at 712, 502 S.E.2d at 515.
314. Id.
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On appeal the innocent victims argued that because they were the
unintended victims of the perpetrator's conduct, their resulting injuries
were both unintended and unanticipated.3 15 Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded that "the assault and battery exclusion at issue is
ambiguous regarding its application to their unique situation and that
316
the exclusion therefore must be construed in favor of the insured."
The court noted that the supreme court gave a broad definition to "arose
out of' and that the "exclusionary clause ['arising out of'] is focused
solely upon the genesis of a plaintiff's claims. If those claims arose out
of the excluded culpable conduct, coverage need not be provided."317
Applying the "but for" analysis adopted in Jefferson, the court held that
"but for the assault perpetrated by Roberts there could be no claim by
either Eady or Kittles, as the injuries giving rise to their claims would
not have occurred."31 As a result, the court deemed the assault and
battery exclusion to be applicable and absolved Capitol Indemnity of
coverage. 319
32 °
the insurer was
In Capitol Alliance Insurance Co. v. Cartwright,
also successful in avoiding coverage. Capitol Alliance provided a
commercial general liability policy to Franklin Transportation, a motor
contract carrier. Cartwright filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking
coverage under the Capitol Alliance policy for injuries he sustained when
an item being hauled by Franklin on a trailer owned by Triple Crown
fell off the trailer. Capitol Alliance's commercial general liability policy
contained an automobile liability exclusion that did not afford coverage
for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of a trailer or
semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads. Franklin appeared to
comprehend the effectiveness of this exclusion and obtained coverage
from another carrier to cover the excluded risk.321
Notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary regarding the
allegations of vagueness and ambiguity, the court of appeals found that
because the express provisions of the Capitol Alliance policy were "clear
and unambiguous, construction of the policy is unnecessary."3 22 A
slight twist to this case was that one of the defendants, Triple Crown,

315. Id. at 713, 502 S.E.2d at 515.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 714, 502 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 269 Ga. 213, 216,

496 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1998)).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320.

236 Ga. App. 554, 512 S.E.2d 666 (1999).

321. Id. at 555-56, 512 S.E.2d at 667-68.
322. Id. at 557, 512 S.E.2d at 669.
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sought coverage pursuant to indemnification. 23 Although the trial
court determined that the policy was ambiguous because the automobile
exclusion barred coverage but the contractual indemnity exclusion did
not, the court of appeals noted that there was no ambiguity because the
injuries for which recovery was24sought "arose out of the use of a trailer,
a risk excluded by the policy."

In Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pat's Rentals, Inc.,3 25 the
supreme court, holding that punitive damages were not recoverable
under a policy of insurance that only required the carrier to pay
damages for injury to which the insurance applied, determined that the
policy did not apply to the underlying injuries.3 26 As in Capitol
Alliance, Grain Dealers provided to Pat's Rentals a commercial general
liability policy that contained an automobile exclusion. 2 ' While the
court of appeals determined that the automobile exclusion eliminated
coverage for the claim of negligent hiring and retention, it also
determined that the policy covered
punitive damages arising out of
3 28
negligent hiring and retention.

Reversing this decision, the supreme court relied upon a provision in
the policy that provided "[w]e will pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury'
[or] 'property damage'. . . to which this insurance applies." 2 9 Because
the court of appeals had previously determined that the policy did not
apply to bodily injury or property damage because of the automobile
liability exclusion, 3 3"Pat's Rentals [was not] legally obligated to pay
punitive damages."

1

Cancellation for nonpayment of premiums was the subject of Oriental
Farmers Food Corp. v.Agency Services, Inc.331 Oriental Farmers
entered into a premium finance agreement with Agency Services, and
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the finance agreement, Agency
Services canceled the policy for nonpayment of the premium.3 2 The
court of appeals upheld the cancellation and found that Agency Services

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 556, 512 S.E.2d at 668.
Id.
269 Ga. 691, 505 S.E.2d 729 (1998).
Id. at 693, 505 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 692, 505 S.E.2d at 729-30.
Id.

329. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 730.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 693, 505 S.E.2d at 730.
237 Ga. App. 75, 514 S.E.2d 80 (1999).
Id. at 75, 514 S.E.2d at 80.
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properly complied with Georgia's ten-day notice requirement and proof
of mailing regarding the notice of cancellation.33
Oriental Farmers argued that Agency Services waived its right to
insist on a forfeiture of the policy because of correspondence forwarded
after the effective date of cancellation.3 " The court noted, however,
that "the correspondence from [Agency Services] to [Oriental Farmers]
contained clear statements that any subsequent payments by [Oriental
Farmers] or actions seeking reinstatement of the policy.., would not
guarantee that the policy would either remain in force or be reinstated."3 5
Even though Oriental Farmers attempted to update its
payments and reinstate the policy, the insurer subsequently denied the
reinstatement request.3 6
In Mack v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,3 s7 the court of
appeals held that money was not tangible property and therefore was
33 8
not property damage as defined in Nationwide's insurance policy.
In reaching this decision, the court noted that money "exists, however,
solely within our minds and thus cannot be touched, weighed, or seen
.... Most money exists only as a number recorded on a computer, the
total of coins and notes in circulation represents but a small fraction of
the money owned by governments, individuals, corporations, and
others."" 9
The business liability policy afforded coverage for property damage,
which it defined as "'loss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured.'"3 4
The underlying action giving rise to the
declaratory judgment action arose out of allegations that interest
charged and collected on retail installment contracts financing consumer
purchases were at a rate in excess of the legal maximum allowed by
O.C.G.A. section 10-1-1.41
In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals distinguished the concept of money and losses that occur as a
result of physical objects, such as coins or notes that represent
money,
342
from the material object and cognitive concept of money.

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 75-76, 514 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 76, 514 S.E.2d at 82.
Id. at 77, 514 S.E.2d at 82.
Id.
238 Ga. App. 149, 517 S.E.2d 839 (1999).
Id. at 151, 517 S.E.2d at 841.
Id. at 150, 517 S.E.2d at 840.
Id. at 149, 517 S.E.2d at 840.
Id.
Id. at 150, 517 S.E.2d at 840.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

350

(Vol. 51

Standing to sue was the issue in CIT Group/Equipment Financing,
Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. 4" CIT, the
designated loss payee under Powell's insurance policy with Northbrook,
attempted to recover, under the terms and conditions of the policy, a loss
incurred by Powell.'" The trial court determined that CIT did not
have standing to sue in its own right, but the court of appeals reversed
because it was not possible to determine either the amount of insurance
proceeds at
issue or the amount of Powell's indebtedness under the sales
45
3

contract.

Absent an affirmative promise or other act waiving the limitation,
courts will enforce a two-year statute of limitations contained within the
policy's two-year limitation period. In Stapleton v. General Accident
Insurance Co.,3 46 the evidence revealed that the insured filed suit after

the two-year limitation period contained within the policy. However,
Stapleton asserted that she did not file suit within the two-year
limitation period because the
adjuster assured her that General Accident
3 47
would pay all of her claim.

Notwithstanding Stapleton's argument to the contrary, the evidence
revealed that General Accident merely continued to negotiate with
Stapleton, waiting for documentation supporting her claim. Stapleton
even admitted that neither General Accident nor the adjuster told her
not to file suit.3

48

Accordingly, the court upheld the limitation period

and dismissed Stapleton's complaint.3 49 "'[M]erely negotiating for a
possible settlement of a disputed claim which is unsuccessfully
accomplished is not conduct designed to lull the claimant into a false
sense of security and does
not preclude an assertion of the contractual'
350
suit limitation period."

VIII.

CONCLUSION

There were no watershed decisions affecting insurance law in
Georgia, but the General Assembly was proactive in the area of managed
health care. Insurance carriers effectively utilized declaratory judgment
actions not only in successfully contesting coverage, but also in avoiding
bad faith claims. When correctly utilized, the declaratory judgment
343. 237 Ga. App. 524, 515 S.E.2d 845 (1999).
344. Id. at 525, 515 S.E.2d at 846.
345. Id. at 524-25, 515 S.E.2d at 847.
346. 236 Ga. App. 835, 512 S.E.2d 645 (1999).
347. Id. at 835, 512 S.E.2d at 647.
348. Id. at 838, 512 S.E.2d at 647.
349. Id., 512 S.E.2d at 647-48.
350. Id., 512 S.E.2d at 647 (quoting Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Okonkwo, 218 Ga.
App. 59, 61, 460 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1995)).
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action serves the dual purpose of protecting the insured while allowing
the insurer to adjudicate its rights and obligations under the policy.
Consequently, declaratory judgment actions will continue as the process
for clarifying questions of coverage. Yet, to utilize a declaratory
judgment action, the insurer must not have taken a position as to the
insured's claim and denied coverage. One area of insurance law that
promises to demonstrate the greatest change is health and disability
insurance, mostly because of the interest and concern about managed
health care. The General Assembly enacted the managed care diligence
statute, and, as with most new statutes of this nature, great discussion
and debate is anticipated, particularly when people's health coverage is
concerned.

